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Estate of SALLIE LEFTWICH DUKE, Deceased. HARRY 
G. LOGAN, Appellant, v. JESS 0. SHELBY, JR., as 
Executor, et al., Respondents. 
[1] Wills-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-Policy of 
law which underlies Prob. Code, § 70, relating to revocation 
of will by subsequent marriage of testator unless provision is 
made for spouse, is social disfavor toward testator's failure to 
provide for surviving spouse. 
[2] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-The law pre-
sumes that subsequent marriage of testator has wrought such 
a change in his condition in life as to cause him to destroy 
or cancel a previous will, and does not admit of evidence to 
contrary unless provision has been made according to law for 
wife and children who have survived him. 
[3] !d.-Revocation-Change in Circumstances.-At common law, 
revocation of a will because of subsequent change in domestic 
relations of testator was based on his implied intention. 
[4] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-In California, 
common-law doctrine of implied revocation has been replaced 
by statutory presumption of revocation which operates on 
showing that spouse married testator after making of will 
and survived maker; these things being shown, the will is re-
voked as to spouse regardless of wishes of deceased unless 
testamentary document includes provision for spouse by mar-
riage contract, provision for spouse in the will, or mention of 
spouse therein in such way as to show intention to make such 
provision. (Prob. Code, § 70.) 
[5] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-Although a 
testator need not make provision for a future spouse, he is 
required to bear in mind the possibility of a subsequent mar-
riage and serious changes in domestic relations resulting there-
from. 
l6] Id.- Revocation- Marriage After Making WilL-Although 
broad enough to include a spouse, exclusionary clauses in a will 
which fail to indicate that testator contemplated the possibility 
of a later marriage are insufficient to avoid revocation of will. 
[7] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making Will.-Clause in 
will whereby testatrix has excluded "any person or persons 
[1] Marriage as revoking will, note, 92 A.L.R. 1010. See, also, 
Cal.Jur., Wills, § 151; Am.Jur., Wills, § 526. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4, 5] Wills, § 257; [3) Wills, § 256; 
[6-8] Wills, § 260; [9] Wills, § 560; [10] Wills, § 548. 
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who may, after the date of this will, become my heir or heirs 
by reason of marriage or otherwise" clearly states an intention 
not to provide for a class of persons which necessarily would 
include a future spouse. 
[8] Id.- Revocation- Marriage After Making WilL-Although 
extrinsic evidence may be received to resolve an ambiguity 
resulting from uncertain language appearing in a will (Prob. 
Code, § 105), where no uncertainty appears in terms of will 
by which a future spouse is excluded, extrinsic evidence con-
cerning testatrix' intention in this regard should not be re-
ceived. 
[9] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Evidence.-Al-
though extrinsic evidence concerning testatrix' intention with 
regard to future spouse was improperly received in absence of 
any uncertainty in terms of will excluding such spouse, no 
prejudice resulted to either party where such evidence merely 
tended to support correct legal conclusion of trial court con-
cerning effect of will. 
[10] !d.-Appeal-Orders Appealable.-No appeal lies from an 
order refusing to vacate a judgment predicated on an order 
denying petition to revoke probate of a will, and a purported 
appeal therefrom will he dismissed. (Prob. Code, § 1240.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County predicated on order denying petition to revoke 
probate of a will, and from an order denying a motion to 
vacate the judgment. Dean Sherry, Judge. Judgment af-
firmed; appeal from order dismissed. 
David H. Thompson, Riley & Ferguson and John M. Riley 
for Appellant. 
Russell G. Taliaferro for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-The petition of Harry G. Logan to revoke 
the probate of the will of Sallie l.J. l.Jogan, his deceased wife, 
was denied. The appeal from the judgment subsequently 
entered requires a construction of the will in connection with 
the provisions of section 70 of the Probate Code. 
There is no controversy as to the facts. In April, 1949, 
the testatrix obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from 
CarlL. Duke. One month later, she executed the will, which 
has been admitted to probate. By this will she gave the bulk 
of her estate to her daughter, I1eah Jamison Herzer, with an 
alternative gift to her grandchildren, in the event the daugh-
ter should predecease her. Jess 0. Shelby, a grandson, was 
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named executor. Her marriage to Logan occurred in May, 
1950, and continued until her death in November of 1951. 
The will includes the following provision: 
''FouRTH: I have, except as otherwise specifically pro-
vided in this will, intentionally and with full knowledge, 
omitted to provide for my former husband, CARL L. DUKE, 
and for any child or children, relatives or heirs who may be 
living at the time of my death, ineluding any person or 
persons who may, after the date of this will, become my heir 
or heirs by reason of marriage or otherwise." 
As a conclusion of law from the facts which have been 
stated, the court declared that the will showed on its face 
the intention of the testatrix to make no provision for Logan 
by excluding specifically a class of which he is a member. 
In the District Court of Appeal, over the objection of the 
appellant, the respondents were permitted to offer addi-
tional evidence bearing upon the intent of the testatrix. It 
was stipulated that, in lieu of hearing oral testimony, the 
affidavits of Leah Jamison Herzer and Jess 0. Shelby might 
be considered. 
According to those affidavits, Logan and the testatrix were 
acquainted for a period of about nine years prior to their 
marriage. They visited each other's homes, both before and 
after the death of I~ogan 's former wife in February, 1949. 
In Jnly of that year, he and the testatrix disclosed to the 
affiants their intention to be married as soon as her divorce 
became final. Their plans were announced publicly the fol-
lowing month. 
Logan takes the position that section 70 of the Probate Code 
prohibited the consideration of extrinsic evidence concerning 
the intent of the testatrix to make provision for him or to 
exclude him from her will. Furthermore, he contends, the 
District Court of Appeal erred in permitting the introduction 
of additional evidence on appeal. His final argument is that, 
even if the extrinsic evidence properly may be considered, the 
will cannot be construed as showing an intention of the tes-
tatrix not to provide for him. 
Section 70 of the Probate Code provides: ''If a person 
marries after making a will, and the spouse survives the 
maker, the will is revoked as to the spouse, unless provision 
has been made for the spouse by marriage contract, or unless 
the spouse is provided for in the will, or in such way men-
tioned therein as to show an intention not to make such pro-
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vision ; and no other evidence to rebut the presumption of 
revocation can be received.'' 
[1] The policy of law which underlies this section has 
been declared to be the social disfavor toward a testator's 
failure to provide for a surviving spouse. (Sanders v. Sirn-
cich, 65 Cal. 50, 52 [2 P. 741] ; Rundell v. McDonald, 41 Cal. 
App. 175, 181 [182 P. 450].) [2] As the court said in the 
Sanders case, " [ t] he law presumes that the subsequent mar-
riage of a testator has wrought such a change in his condition 
in life as to cause him to destroy or cancel a previous will ; and 
does not admit of evidence to the c<mtrary unless provision has 
been made according to law for wife and children who have 
survived him." (P. 52.) 
[3] At common law, a revocation of a will because of a 
subsequent change in domestic relations of a testator was 
based upon his implied intention. (See Estate of Meyer, 
44 Cal.App. 289, 291 [186 P. 393]; 1 Page on Wills [Lifetime 
eel.], § 507 et seq. ; Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills 
[1937], § 166, pp. 400-404.) [4] In California, the doctrine 
of implied revocation has been replaced by a statutory pre-
sumption of revocation which operates upon the showing that 
the spouse married the testator after the making of the will 
and survived the maker. (In re Comassi, 107 Cal. 1, 4 [ 40 
P. 15,28 L.R.A. 414]; Estate of Meyer. supra, p. 291.) These 
things being shown, the will is revoked as to the spouse, 
regardless of what may have been the wishes of the deceased 
unless the testamentary document includes: (1) provision for 
the spouse by marriage contract; (2) provision for the spouse 
in the will; or (3) mention of the spouse therein in such way 
as to show an intention not to make such provision. (Prob. 
Code, § 70; Corker v. Corker, 87 Cal. 643, 648 [25 P. 922] ; 
Estate of Turney, 101 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [226 P.2d 80).) 
There is no contention that Logan was provided for by a 
marriage contract or in the will. The respondents contend 
that, by the disinheriting clause of the will, Logan was "in 
such way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to 
make such provision." In reply, Logan takes the position 
that the clause is of the most general nature and cannot be 
construed as indicating an intention to exclude an after-
acquired husband. 
Considering the word ''mention,'' as used in this section, 
this court said in Estate of Kurtz, 190 Cal. 146 [210 P. 959]: 
"No reason is perceived why the wife could not be 'mentioned' 
by any description that would include her. Certainly it would 
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not be necessary to mention her by name and to include her, 
as she was included, in the description of a class, 'mentions' 
her as effectually as if she had been named therein.'' ( P. 149.) 
Later cases, construing somewhat similar exclusionary 
clauses, have tended to restrict the broad rule stated in the 
Kurtz decision. An apparent basis for this tendency is the 
recognition that to permit avoidance of revocation of a will 
by such generally worded exclusionary clauses as are com-
monly used for other purposes may subvert the statutory 
purpose. 
[5] Where a will has been executed prior to the marriage, 
it is probably the unusual case in which a person does so 
intending either to provide for or to exclude a future spouse. 
And, although a testator need not make provision for such 
a spouse, he is required to bear in mind the possibility of a 
subsequent marriage and the serious changes in domestic 
relations resulting therefrom. The Supreme Court of Georgia 
said of a similar statute : ''The object of the provision is to 
secure a specific moral influence upon the testamentary act-
the moral influence of having in mind a contingent event so 
momentous as marriage ... , and so deserving of considera-
tion in framing a testamentary scheme." (Ellis v. Darden, 86 
Ga. 368, 372 [12 S.E. 652, 653, 11 L.R.A. 51] ; quoted with 
approval in Estate of JJ1eyer, supra, p. 292.) 
[6] Accordingly, although broad enough to include a 
spouse, exclusionary clauses which fail to indicate that the 
testator contemplated the possibility of a later marriage have 
been held to be insufficient to avoid a revocation of the will. 
(Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d 761 [147 P.2d 1] [exclusion 
of "all my heirs who are not specifically mentioned herein"] ; 
Estate of Rozen-Goldenberg, 1 Cal.App.2d 631 [37 P.2d 132] 
[exclusion of heirs living at the time of testatrix' demise] ; 
Estate of Turney, supra [omission of "my heirs living at the 
time of my demise"]; cf. Estate of Ryan, 191 Cal. 307, 311 
[216 P. 366] [naming future spouse executrix held insufficient 
to indicate "that decedent contemplated matrimony" at the 
time the will was drawn].) 
A further inquiry, and one which is decisive in this case, 
is whether to be sufficient such a clause must show that the 
testator contemplated marriage to a specific person. This 
question has not been considered in California but a statute 
almost identical in wording to Probate Code, section 70, was 
construed in In re Hall's Estate, 159 Wash. 236 [292 P. 401]. 
41 C.2d-17 
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There the will provided: ''I hereby direct that in the event 
that I should remarry that said marriage shall in no wise 
alter or affect the disposition of my property but that ... my 
separate property shall be distributed in the manner herein-
before set forth .... " It was further provided that a sur-
viving spouse should receive only the community property. 
Although recognizing that the clause did not show that 
the testatrix had in mind marriage to a particular person, the 
court held that the clause was sufficient to avoid a revocation 
of the will. "The words 'my husband' spoken in the future 
tense are as specific as words commonly used to describe 
after-born children, and it is a common practice to make pro-
vision in wills for any after-born child, which practice we 
... have upheld." (292 P. 403.) In practice, a testator may 
have good grounds for preferring that his will stand despite 
any future marriage, and no sound reason is suggested why he 
may not express his intention by a clause referring to a future 
spouse in general terms. The Hall case is persuasive authority 
for permitting a testator to do so. 
[7] In the will presently under consideration, the testa-
trix has excluded "any person or persons who may, after 
the date of this will, become my heir or heirs by reason of 
marriage or otherwise." (Emphasis added.) By this pro-
vision she clearly stated an intention not to provide for a 
class of persons which necessarily would include a future 
spouse. In addition, she declared that the classification in-
cludes any person who may thereafter become her heir ''by 
reason of marriage,'' a phrase which must necessarily refer to 
her future marriage, if it is to be given legal significance. 
Under such circumstances, the will mentioned a future spouse 
in such way as to show an intention not to provide for him. 
A substantial portion of the briefs of both parties has been 
devoted to argument concerning the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence to establish the testatrix' intention. This evidence 
was admitted on the authority of Estate of Kttrtz, supra. 
In that case, the testator disinherited "each and all persons 
whatsoever claiming to be, and who may be, my heirs at law, 
except as such may be determined by this will, and if any 
of such parties or such heirs, or any person whomsoever who, 
if I died intestate, would be entitled to any part of my estate, 
shall [attack the will], I hereby give ... to said person One 
($1.00) Dollar .... " The probate court refused to receive 
extrinsic evidence showing that the will was executed on the 
day prior to the decedent's marriage. Upon appeal, the re-
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jection of such evidence was held to be erroneous. "It was 
admissible for the purpose of showing who the maker of the 
will intended to include by the phrase 'any person whomso-
ever who, if I died intestate, would be entitled to any part 
of my estate,' a phrase which, if he had not been then engaged 
to marry the contestant, would be somewhat ambiguous, but 
which would be made certain by showing the fact of such en-
gagement. Evidence is always admissible to show extrinsic 
facts which serve to explain the meaning of ambiguous words 
appearing on the face of a will, and this evidence was ad-
missible for that purpose." (P. 149.) 
Logan argues that the Kurtz case was overruled by Estate 
of Ryan, supra, and Estate of Axcelrocl, supra. However, 
neither of these decisions disapproved the Kurtz case, al-
though in Estate of Axcelrocl the court expressly withheld 
approval of that portion of the opinion which sanctioned the 
taking of extrinsic evidence. In both the Ryan and Axcelrod 
cases the court was confronted with testamentary language 
differing from that considered in Estate of Kurtz, and it 
very properly distinguished the latter decision upon that basis. 
[8] Although the Kurtz decision correctly holds that ex-
trinsic evidence may be received to resolve an ambiguity 
resulting from uncertain language appearing in a will (Prob. 
Code, § 105; Estate of Kearns, 36 Cal.2d 531, 537 [225 P.2d 
218] ) , the application of the rule to the will involved in that 
case is questionable. Such words as "heirs at law," "in-
testate,'' and the like, rather tl1an presenting an ambig-uity 
concerning whether a testator had in mind the possibility of 
a future marriage, are merely noncommittal upon the issue. 
They serve to indicate neither the presence nor absence of 
such a mental state, and to remedy such omission by resort to 
extrinsic evidence would be contrary to the express terms of 
Probate Code, section 70. ( Cf. Estate of Ryan, supra, p. 310; 
Estate of Garra~~d, 35 Cal. 336, 341-342.) 
In the present case, no uncertainty appears in the terms 
of the will by which a future spouse is excluded. Accordingly, 
extrinsic evidence concerning the testatrix' intention in this 
regard should not have been received. [9] However, because 
such evidence merely tended to support the correct legal con-
clusion of the trial court concerning the effect of the will, no 
prejudice resulted to either party. 
[10] Logan also appealed from the order denying his 






















G16 ESTATE OF DUKE [41 C.2d 
an order, the latter appeal must be dismissed. (Prob. Code, 
§ 1240; see Estate of Winslow, 128 Cal. 311, 312 [60 P. 931] ; 
cf. In re Walkedy, 94 Cal. 352, 353 [29 P. 719]; In re Sey-
mour, 15 Cal.App. 287, 288-290 [114 P. 1023] .) 
The judgment is affirmed and the purported appeal from 
the order is dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I reiterate the views expressed in my concurring opmwn 
in Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d 761, 769 [147 P.2d 1]. The 
,vords in the will in the Axcelrod case which are held not 
sufficient to escape the revocatory effect of marriage after 
execution of the will were that the testator intentionally 
omitted all "heirs" not mentioned in the will and expressly 
disinherited them. In the present case the only words in addi-
tion to "heirs" are "heirs by reason of marriage or other-
wise." That is not sufficient as the word "heirs" alone would 
include an heir by marriage as well as by consanguinity and 
the use of "heirs" alone is not a sufficient mentioning under 
the Axcelrod case to disinherit a spouse married after the 
execution of a will. Estate of Kurtz, 190 Cal. 146 [210 P. 959] 
is to the contrary but that case, although distinguished in the 
Axcelrod case, was in effect overruled thereby. (See discuR-
sion 82 Cal.L.Rev. 213.) 
The statute (Prob. Code, § 70) provides that if a person is 
married after the execution of the will, the will is revoked as 
to the after acquired spouse unless the spouse is in such ·way 
"mentioned" therein as to show an intention not to make 
provision for him or her. The latest general definition of 
''mentioned'' is: ''As a verb, 'mention' is definert in \11[ eb-
ster's New International Dictionary, 2d edition (1943), as 
'To make mention of; to refer to ... casually; to specify, 
esp. by name; to name,' and as a noun the word is employed 
to indicate 'a speaking or notice, esp. in a brief or cursory man-
ner; a specification, usually by name; casual introduction into 
speech or writing; naming, esp. incidentally.' '' (Hunt v. 
Mayor & Council of Riverside, 31 Cal.2d 619, 626 [191 P.2d 
426].) Specifically applied to section 70, various factors must 
be considered in determining the sufficiency of the words of 
mention to escape revocation. Having in mind the words 
used in Estate of Axcelrod, supra, 23 Cal.2d 761, the court 
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there said: ''A person who was then a stranger, both in con-
sanguinity and affinity, and whose subsequent relationship 
was yet to be projected, could scarcely have been considered 
by the testatrix as an 'heir,' much less, a surviving husband. 
She said in her will, 'I have intentionally omitted all of my 
heirs who are not specifically mentioned herein, ·intending 
thereby to disinherit them ... ' (Italics added.) Insofar as 
the operation of section 70 of the Probate Code is concerned 
her intention is to be determined only as of the date of the 
execution of the instrument. (See Estate of Carter (1942), 
49 Cal.App.2d 251, 254 [121 P.2d 540] .) A man does not 
'omit' the name of his child from a document if he has no 
child; a woman does not 'omit' her h1lsband from her will 
if she has no husband in fact or in contemplation . ... 
"Mere general phraseology such as that which is employed 
in the will now before us cannot be construed to mention the 
appellant-a subsequently acquired husband-' in such way 
... as to show an intention not to make' provision for him. 
He is not mentioned at all. The only word used which could 
possibly include him is the word 'heirs.' But at the time the 
will was executed the testatrix had no husband who could 
become an 'heir.' If she was at that time contemplating 
marrying anyone it may have been someone other than appel-
lant. The will does not mention appellant by name or by 
contemplated relationship or otherwise in any way by which 
he can be identified as a particular person who was in her mind 
at that time. Since it does not identify him by name or by 
eontemplated relationship, or designate a classification which 
slwws on its face that it necessarily was then the intention 
of the testatrix to include therein a subsequently to be acquired 
husband, it cannot be held that such a subsequently acquired 
husband has been mentioned .... 
" 'It would appear that the intention [if any] to make 
no provision for the future surviving spouse would have teJ 
be set out with greater certainty and explicitness than in the 
instant case if the revocation provided by section 70 of the 
Probate Code is to be averted, where, as here, there is no 
marriage contract and no provision for such survivor in the 
will.'" (Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d 761, 767 [147 P.2d 1]; 
emphasis added.) In Estate of T~trney, 101 Cal.App.2c1 720 
[226 P.2d 80], the words used by the testatrix were that she 
had omitted to provide for "my heirs living at the time of my 
dernise." They were held insufficient to disinherit an after 
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acquired spouse, the court stating: ''A party seeking to rebut 
the statutory presumption of revocation must bring himself 
within the literal terms of one of the exceptions. (See Corker 
v. Corker, 87 Cal. 643 [25 P. 922] ; Estate of Smith, 15 Cal. 
App.2d 548 [59 P.2d 854] .) " (Estate of Turney, 101 Cal.App. 
2d 720, 722 [226 P.2d 80]; emphasis added.) 
To the same effect are Estate of Rozen-Goldenberg, 1 Cal. 
App.2d 631 [37 P.2d 132], and Estate of Ryan, 191 Cal. 307 
[216 P. 366]. 
From the foregoing it is and should be the rule that there 
is not sufficient mention of the after acquired spouse to pre-
vent revocation unless, on the face of the will, the prospective 
spouse is named or if designated by a general term it appears 
that the testator or testatrix contemplated marriage. This 
gives meaning and effect to section 70 and prevents its evasion 
by general words which do not indicate any real intention to 
disinherit an after acquired spouse because the question was 
never really given concrete consideration by the testator or 
testatrix. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. 
In my view the policy and the express law of this state as 
enunciated in section 70 of the Probate Code, and as upheld 
by this court in Estate of Axcelrod (1944), 23 Cal.2d 761, 
767-768 [147 P.2d 1], disclose the complete untenability of 
the majority's discussion and conclusion. 
In accord with section 70 and Estate of Axcelrod I would 
reverse the judgment. 
